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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of land concentration
prompted by the distribution of disentailed church land during the second half
of the 19th century on the accumulation of human capital in early 20th century
Colombia1. Using existing primary sources on the process of land disentailment
and the 1912 National Census at the municipal level, descriptive statistics and
econometric evidence show a significant and negative relationship between the
amount of disentailed land during the 1870s and literacy and school enrolment
rates of males in 1912.
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RESUMEN
El documento tiene como objetivo analizar los efectos que tuvo la con-
centracio´n de tierras desamortizadas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX
sobre la acumulacio´n de capital humano, a principios del siglo XX en
Colombia2. Utilizando las fuentes primarias existentes sobre el proceso de
desamortizacio´n de tierras y el Censo Nacional de 1912 a nivel municipal, las
estadı´sticas descriptivas y los ejercicios econome´tricos muestran la exis-
tencia de una relacio´n negativa y significativa entre la cantidad de tierra
desamortizada durante la de´cada de 1870 con la tasa de alfabetismo y la
proporcio´n de hombres matriculados en la escuela en 1912.
Palabras clave: polı´ticas de desamortizacio´n, concentracio´n de tierra,
instituciones, capital humano, historia de Colombia
«That one of the major obstacles for the prosperity and growth of our
Nation is the lack of movement and free circulation of a large amount of
property, which is the basis of public wealth»
President Toma´s Cipriano de Mosquera (1861)
1. INTRODUCTION
The study of institutions — that is, the rules of the game operative in
society, (North 1993) — and their evolution in history is crucial to explain the
economic performance of a given country and the role played by the accu-
mulation of human capital. The institutional approach has been widely used as
a framework to explain the poor economic performance in the Latin American
region3. According to this view, favourable factor endowment conditions in the
colonial period, namely abundance of precious metals and relatively plentiful
native labour, prompted the rise of excluding institutions — economic, political
and those related to property rights — which only benefited a small group of
individuals, particularly landowners and those of Spanish origin.
2 La tierra desamortizada correspondio´ a aquella que durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX
los gobiernos liberales le expropiaron a la Iglesia. Los ejidos o´ tierras comunales tambie´n fueron
rematados durante este proceso.
3 Among the most influential papers on this approach are those by Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2001)
and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002).
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Even after independence, according to Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) and
De Ferranti et al. (2003), these institutions remained basically unmodified —
excluding the institutions that persisted — as the small group of landowners and
the ruling elite continued to reap the benefits for themselves. The above-
mentioned view has nevertheless been subjected to some revision. Recent
research by Coatsworth (2008), Dobado (2009) and Dye (2006) has shown that,
on the one hand, Latin American levels of colonial inequality were lower than
post-independence levels and, on the other, that post-independence institutional
change in the region had different dynamics, which explains the diversity of
political and economic outcomes in Latin America during the 19th century.
Dye (2006) shows, for instance, that one of the chief institutional changes
introduced during the post-independence period was the transformation of
property rights over land. Thus, the land policies implemented were aimed at
formalizing the property rights of squatters through titling and at eliminating
archaic property rights such as entailed church land. A key outcome of such
reforms would be the reduction in the concentration of land ownership, as
Sa´nchez et al. (2010) and Coatsworth (2008) have pointed out. In fact, all
land reforms undertaken by the 19th century Colombian administrations
were aimed at increasing access to and ownership of land to new social
groups. It was widely believed that a more egalitarian distribution of land
property would help to overcome poverty and backwardness. The most
important land policies carried out after independence were the sale and
grant of public land (baldı´os) and the disentailment (expropriation) of
Catholic Church land. The analysis of the process, outcomes and impact of
the latter is the purpose of this paper.
Liberal administrations undertook the expropriation of church assets
during the second half of the 19th century arguing their lack of productive
use (mortmain; see Villegas 1977)4. Throughout the colonial period, the
clergy had accumulated a large amount of wealth and, thanks to its evan-
gelizing function, had entailed considerable areas of land that had made the
Catholic Church the largest landowner in the country5. Liberal politicians
believed that the concentration of land ownership was one of the chief
obstacles to economic growth. Thus, the Liberal President, Toma´s Cipriano
de Mosquera, on 9 September 1861, decreed the disentailment of mortmain
properties so as to implement a more egalitarian distribution of land (see
Nu´n˜ez 1862; Alarco´n 1973).
During the 19th century, Republican institutions attempted to modify the
structure of property rights to establish a more democratic distribution of land.
4 The decree ordered that all ecclesiastic properties (urban and rural) with little market activity
be appropriated by the State. Properties not included in this process included those associated with
the sect, schools, hospitals, prisons, markets and the residence of clergy members.
5 According to Alarco´n (1973, p. 50), the Church obtained ownership of large amounts of
indigenous land by claiming that its value was inferior to that of soul salvation.
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One of these attempts was land disentailment. Nevertheless, historical scho-
larship on the subject has shown that this goal was not achieved and land
remained concentrated in the hands of individuals belonging to or connected
with political circles (see Dı´az 1977; Alarco´n 1973; Villegas 1977). In other
words, disentailed land was appropriated by the existing elite and did not lead
to a less concentrated structure of property as argued by Villegas (1977). This
outcome may in fact have reinforced the perverse effects of excluding institu-
tions — set up during the colonial period — on the provision of public goods.
Thus, the concentration of property rights over land inherited from the colonial
period may have curbed the reduction of land concentration, which was the
key objective of land policy towards church land. Based on the quantitative
evidence of disentailed land purchases, the primary objective of this paper is
to verify empirically the negative relationship between the concentration of
disentailed land on the accumulation of human capital in 1912 measured by
rates of literacy and school enrolment of males. This paper comprises six
sections, including this introduction. The second section reviews the literature
on institutions and long-run economic performance. The third approaches the
historical context in which disentailment occurred, corroborating that land
distribution in fact remained concentrated. The fourth examines the relation-
ship between the accumulation of human capital and the concentration of
disentailed land. In the fifth section, an econometric model is estimated and the
results are interpreted. The sixth section concludes the paper.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Some economic development literature suggests that the current differ-
ences in economic development between countries originated as early as
the colonial period. There is a significant amount of research dedicated
to exploring the historical roots of economic divergence. For instance,
Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that the countries which were relatively wealthy
during the colonial period (as is the case of the Spanish colonies in Latin
America, for example) are less developed today in comparison to those that
were poor during the same period (United States and Canada). They con-
clude that the types of institutions established during the colonial period are
responsible for today’s divergence. The initial wealth of Latin America con-
sisted of precious metals and a native population induced the creation of
extractive institutions for the sole benefit of the colonizers, so that a very
limited group of individuals exercised political and economic power. In
contrast, the lack of native labour and of gold or silver mines in North
America motivated the creation of more permanent settlements based on
land ownership, thus developing more egalitarian institutions.
In this regard, Engerman and Sokoloff (1999, 2002) and De Ferranti et al.
(2003) point out that in North America, geographic conditions (which
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favoured crops characterized by constant returns scale), along with the scar-
city of indigenous labour, promoted the settlement of colonizers on family
farms (a more egalitarian distribution of land), bringing about a more
democratic structure of political and economic power6. In Latin America, the
availability of indigenous labour and geographic conditions favouring large
plantation crops, which experienced economies of scale, led to institutions
that reproduced the concentrated structure of economic and political power7.
The nature of institutions (democratic or excluding) would continue over time
leading to the persistence of the initial political and economic inequalities.
Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1999, 2002)
claim that the excluding institutions of the colonial period persisted even after
independence (which occurred in most cases during the 19th century) as the
elite continued to reap the political and economic benefits they had enjoyed
until then. Likewise, De Ferranti et al. (2003) conclude that not only did initial
inequality persist, but also it actually intensified during the 19th century. For
instance, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) indicate that electoral rules in Latin
America granted voting rights almost exclusively to wealthy and educated
males. In contrast, in North America, restrictions on voting imposed during the
colonial period were partially lifted during the 19th century, thus increasing the
proportion of voters. In this way, the percentage of people who voted in Latin
America was significantly lower than in the United States or Canada8.
Until now, emphasis has been placed on how initial inequalities in Latin
America affected institutional development by benefiting an elite largely
6 This analysis excludes the southern portion of the United States. In this area, the existence of
abundant land and geographic conditions favourable to agriculture that promoted the presence of
economies of scale explains why the institutions established were less democratic than those cre-
ated in the rest of the country (economies of scale stimulated the use of slavery as a labour insti-
tution). On the heterogeneity of the American colonies, see Walton and Rockoff (1998).
7 Recent scholarship has challenged the view that excluding colonial institutions and dis-
tribution of factor endowments are responsible for differences in current economic development.
Dobado (2009) argues that the view of Acemoglu et al. (2001) overstates the development and wealth
of the pre-Columbian societies. In fact, their technological backwardness was quite profound as
they did not have animals for war or agriculture and did not use water-based energy. In addition,
metals were almost exclusively used for ornamental purposes and their sailing techniques were
basic. Thus, given the poverty of the pre-Columbian economies, the hypothesis of the «Reversal of
Fortune» cannot be sustained. In addition, according to Dobado (2009), both Acemoglu et al. (2001)
and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) overlook events that are quite important for economic devel-
opment, such as the demographic collapse of the indigenous populations in the 16th century, which
should have prompted deep changes in the excluding institutions created at the beginning of the
colonial period based precisely on the abundance of the indigenous population. Dobado also
questions the extractive character of the mining industry and plantations (hacienda) showing that
the institutions regulating these activities were basically in private hands.
8 In the United States and Canada, initial voting restrictions (gender, literacy, landholdings)
were gradually lifted so that, at the beginning of the 19th century, voter participation was high: over
50 per cent of adult males in the United States voted (Engerman and Sokoloff 2005). They also
suggest that at the end of the 19th century, electoral participation in Latin America was 75 years
behind that of the United States and Canada. Voting rates in Latin America at that time hovered
around the 1-2 per cent mark.
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made up of landowners. Our intention is to explore how institutions created
in the 19th century, particularly those related to property rights over land,
may have contributed to the persistence of inequality by influencing the
accumulation of human capital.
Land distribution policies during the 19th century in the Americas are at
the heart of the persistence (or change) of property rights institutions, as
Engerman and Sokoloff (1999, 2002) maintain. For instance, in the United
States, according to Walton and Rockoff (1998), the 1862 Homestead Act
granted 160 acres of public land to each colonizer — trading the land lots
for time and work — proving that productive use of the terrain promoted
egalitarian land distribution. In contrast, 19th century Mexican, Argentinean
and Brazilian agrarian policies showed high degrees of inequality. The dis-
tribution of either the new land settlements at the frontier or the old ones
(e.g. church estates) simply mirrored colonial land inequality triggering the
reproduction of existing excluding institutions. Thus, using their political
power, the elite of large landowners took control of the policies aimed at
improving land distribution in order to benefit themselves. One of the most
important features of such an institutional structure is the lack of incentives
on the part of the elite to invest in public goods9. The studies by Galor et al.
(2004), Deininger and Squire (1998) and Sokoloff and Zolt (2007), among
others, find similar patterns: land concentration negatively influenced
investment in human capital10.
The research presented here indicates that land concentration and the
excluding institutions caused by it would persist and reproduce over time.
Policy choices in societies with large wealth inequalities would be less
oriented to the provision of public goods. In the long run, they will exhibit
low levels of human capital, productivity and per capita income. In societies
in which land was scarce or distributed equally (less political influence of
landowners), the economy benefited from greater investment in human
capital and higher economic growth. This paper will analyse the extent to
which Colombia’s land policies — in particular, the distribution of the
9 A study by Banerjee and Lyer (2005) found that in India in 1981 in the regions characterized
by large estates — the so-called «landlord districts» inherited from the British rule — investment in
human capital was lower than in the regions with a more egalitarian distribution of land. They
argue that in the landlord districts, the concentration of power and the political influence of the
landowners inhibited a larger provision of public goods via the policy decisions taken.
10 Galor et al. (2004) show, through the construction of a model of general equilibrium, that
public expenditure on education (taxes) is desirable for everyone in society, with the exception of
landowners, due to the great wealth and position of political privilege that they possess. Deininger
and Squire (1998) found a negative connection between land inequality and poverty levels. They
argue that inequality affects education spending negatively. By analysing the effects that initial
inequality and equality have on the investment in public goods, Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) found that
in the case of Latin America — societies with initial inequalities — the elite used its political
influence to perpetuate those institutional structures that benefited them. In this way, their con-
tribution to public goods remained minimal as they refused to pay direct taxes on property and
wealth.
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expropriated church assets — in the second half of the 19th century modified
neither the existing pattern of land distribution nor the policy choices
towards the provision of public goods. Quite the opposite, despite govern-
ment intentions the allocation of church assets in the second half of the
19th century was concentrated in a handful of individuals. Such an outcome
reduced the prevailing low level of human capital investment even more
(measured as 1912 literacy and school enrolment rates) as will be seen below.
3. DISENTAILED LAND: TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION
OF SECULAR LATIFUNDIO?11
3.1. History of the disentailment of mortmain land (1861-1886)
The catechization and evangelization exercised by the Church during the
colonial period endowed it with a great deal of political and economic power,
which it maintained even after independence and during the Republican era12.
During Liberal rule (in the mid-19th century), the government argued that the
land retained by the Church — due to its lack of mobility on the market
(mortmain) — was a great obstacle to the economic progress of the country. In
consequence, the Liberals adopted measures to weaken the Church’s political
and economic power and to reduce the relationship between the Church and
the State13. On 9 September 1861, the provisional president of the country,
Toma´s Cipriano de Mosquera, publicly announced the «September 9, 1861
decree», on the «disentailment of mortmain land», which deposed the Church of
the land and wealth it had retained since the colonial period, making this land
available for free circulation on the market14.
The Liberal government passed this law with the political objective of
ending the alliance between the Church and the Conservative Party, but also
had two other economic goals in mind. Through the sale of mortmain land,
11 Dı´az (1977) emphasized that while the process of land disentailment abolished clerical
estates, it fortified lay estates.
12 During the colonial period, the enormous patrimony retained by the Church was problematic
even for the Spanish rule as the viceroys had denounced it to the King (Alarco´n 1973; Villegas 1977).
Disentailment polices had already taken place before the Liberal era. For instance, the Republican
government adopted certain measures to weaken the Church’s economic power. One remarkable
case was the closure of several convents in 1821 (Villegas 1977).
13 Anti-clerical reforms adopted by the Liberal government include the following: (i) 1847: the
liberalization of land censuses, which was a tax paid to the Church; (ii) 1851: the suppression of the
tithe and ecclesiastic privileges; (iii) 1853: Church–State separation, eliminating the annuities
assigned to the Church; (iv) 1861: «Rights of tuition», that is the swearing-in of the clergy to the
constitution and to existing and new laws, (Alarco´n 1973; Dı´az 1977; Villegas 1977; Meisel and
Jaramillo 2007).
14 Disentailment was not unique to Colombia. There are cases in other countries in which
disentailment was used as an instrument to reduce the fiscal deficit that afflicted these countries:
Spain (1766-1768 and 1808-1823), Paraguay (1811), Argentina (1822), Chile (1823), Uruguay (1838)
and Mexico (1856-1876) (Alarco´n 1973; Meisel and Jaramillo 2007).
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the government wanted to procure the resources to alleviate the fiscal deficit
resulting from the independence wars, as has been emphasized by Alarco´n
(1973), Dı´az (1977) and Villegas (1977) and more recently by Meisel and
Jaramillo (2007). In addition, the decree was intended to improve land
distribution as well as to promote the insertion of the Church’s properties
into market circulation to stimulate the country’s economic development.
Three mechanisms were employed to this end. The first consisted of offering
these plots of land for sale in public auctions, allowing purchases to be made
in bonds; the second offered them on credit (so that payment could be made
in instalments) and lastly, large estates were divided up into smaller parcels
(see Cipriano de Mosquera 1861; Nu´n˜ez 1862; Alarco´n 1973; Dı´az 1977;
Villegas 1977; Oficina De Investigaciones Socioecono´micas y Legales, Ofisel
1975; Palacios and Safford, 2002; Meisel and Jaramillo 2007)15. In this way,
the Liberals hoped that farmers and their families would be able to access
these lots in public auctions, thus achieving a more equal land distribution.
Minister Rafael Nu´n˜ez’s writing a «public flyer explaining disentailment»
(1862) stated the policy as follows:
«Because this is not just about resuscitating and putting into circulation a
considerable amount of inactive values, (which is itself an ambitious task)
nor is it just about paying the Public Debt, which is an even greater one:
rather this is about certain precedents, because we work with eminently
fertile soil and are on the brink of a more progressive era. I repeat, this is
about solving with disentailment to the greatest extent possible, the ardu-
ous and immense problem of the egalitarian distribution of property».
The process of disentailment of mortmain land continued throughout the
Liberal period until the Conservative Party came to power in 1887. After
reestablishing the relationship between the Church and the State, the
administration then returned the land that had not been sold to the Church,
thus compensating it for the policies introduced under Liberal rule. Never-
theless, it should be noticed that the most dynamic period of this process
took place during the 1860s. During the 1870s, sales began to plummet partly
because of the strong opposition of the Church, and to a great extent because
of the elimination of the Agency of Disentailed Land, whose task of selling
land was transferred to the Treasury, an organization with more pressing
matters to attend to than these land auctions (see Villegas 1977; Meisel and
Jaramillo 2007). As Figure 1 shows, most of the purchases of disentailed land
15 Regarding the division of large estates, Article 6 of the September 9, 1861 decree states:
«Once those rustic and urban haciendas have been inventoried, and the terms of rent have been
determined, they will be transferred in public auction by lots, the division of which will be made in
the smallest possible proportions, in order to increase competition» (in Cipriano de Mosquera
1861).
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occurred during the Liberal administrations in the period 1864-1871, with
the figure falling abruptly during the next decade.
3.2. Property rights and the concentration of disentailed land
in Colombia
The previous section described how the September 9, 1861 decree made it
possible for the central government to enact the disentailment policy with
the purpose of land redistribution. But was this objective achieved? Did this
policy result in a more egalitarian distribution of land?
In order to determine the distribution of disentailed land, two sources of
information were used: the Disentailed Land Fund and the Official Journal or
Diario Oficial. These sources contain lists and descriptions of the assets to be
auctioned and their approval by the Junta Suprema Directiva del Cre´dito
Nacional (Supreme Board of Directors of the National Debt), which was in
charge of determining the successful bid of each auction. The information
compiled from these sources was: the date of sale of the lot, its location (city/
state), size, valued price, the (paid) auction price — mostly in bonds — and
the name of the buyer of each lot16. In total, 1,385 land sales were registered
in different towns and departamentos (states at that time).
FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF PURCHASES OF DISENTAILED LAND
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Source: AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollo 1-30), Diario Oficial
(1864-1884), Villegas (1977) and authors’ calculations.
16 At this point, it is important to note that sales could be approved or disapproved by the
Supreme Board of Directors of National Debt, depending on the relationship between the sale price
and the valued price. This meant that any given lot could be auctioned repeatedly for years until the
Board of Directors approved the sale. Measurements in the auction records were standardized in
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As previously mentioned, the legislation of disentailed land provided for
fairer property distribution in the hope that farmers and indigenous people
would be able to acquire this land through public auctions. Yet the historical
studies of Alarco´n (1973), Dı´az (1977), Villegas (1977) and Oficina De Investi-
gaciones Socioecono´micas y Legales, Ofisel (1975) claim that this objective was
not accomplished. Information from newspapers of that time suggests that
because the process was indeed corrupt — those in charge of land disentail-
ment favoured a small group of individuals — the buyers who ultimately
purchased the land in public auctions were wealthy individuals, usually land-
owners with close ties to political circles17. For instance, a letter from the
people (non-elite) to President Toma´s Cipriano de Mosquera mentioned:
«This very majority (of the liberal population) regrets the disgrace of our
decrees, and everything associated with the behavior of a small circle of
speculators, whose liberalism is only proportionate to the growth of their
wealth and the filling of their caskets (y) This wrong has reached
the degree to which the Junta de Cre´dito Nacional, in keeping with the
demands and influence of this circle, has become an unrecognizable
authority, arbitrator of the fortune and interests of citizens, filling the
coffers of one, snatching away the bread and sustenance from others
(y). In order to eradicate this cancer, your authority is needed»18.
Historical research based on popular opinion articulated in newspapers
has concluded that although land ownership did change hands (the Church
and its communities), the new landowners consisted of a small group of
individuals. In addition to corruption, the low level of participation was due
to ignorance of the procedures and the costs involved in acquiring lots
through public auction (costs of transaction), poverty (making it impossible
for farmers to buy bonds) and finally, threats made by the Church to a largely
Catholic population (see Alarco´n 1973; Oficina De Investigaciones Socio-
econo´micas y Legales, Ofisel 1975; Dı´az 1977; Villegas 1977 )19. In conclu-
sion, pre-existing institutional factors determined that the redistribution of
(F’note continued)
square metres according to the Courvel guide (1940). If the area was unknown, it was calculated
based on the auction sale price, valued price, year of purchase and location.
17 Villegas (1977) documents public opinion expressed in newspapers of the time.
18 Letter sent to President Toma´s Cipriano de Mosquera in 1862 (Villegas 1977, p. 55). Cor-
ruption of the elite was also pointed out in President Mosquera’s response to the people’s letter:
«Secure in this impunity, the members of the Junta Suprema Directiva del Credito Nacional continue to
be negligent with respect to the law, in the fulfillment of their responsibilities, corruption and rebellion
against the orders of legal authorityy».
19 According to Sa´nchez et al. (2010), the fragility of the de jure institutions with respect to the
de facto ones is also visible in the process of distribution of vacant land during the second half of the
19th century, in which large tracts of land were granted to large landholders to the detriment of poor
farmers.
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property rights based on disentailment would simply reproduce the land
concentration that had existed since the colonial period.
Based on historical research, it is possible to argue that despite the fact
that de jure institutions stimulated agrarian reform and land redistribution,
de facto institutions — the influence of landowners on governmental entities
(e.g. the Junta Suprema Directiva del Cre´dito Nacional and the Agency of
Disentailed Land) — encouraged the concentration of disentailed land. The
actual distribution of disentailed land in Table 1 proves such a claim.
Table 1 shows the number of squared kilometres of disentailed land by
department, the valued price, the price paid for the auctioned land (in
bonds), the number of purchases in each state and the concentration index
(Gini) calculated with the information of the area (in squared metre) pur-
chased by each buyer in a particular state from 1864 to1884. During these
years, a total of 1,720.9 km2 of rural and urban land was disentailed in
Colombia. Using current geographical boundaries as a reference, the
departments (current) where most mortmain land was disentailed were:
Santander (20.98 per cent), Cundinamarca (17.34 per cent), Sucre (17.54 per
cent) and Boyaca´ (14.48 per cent). The number of purchases made by the
department was as follows: Cundinamarca (501), Santander (310), Boyaca´
(193) and Narin˜o (189), for a total of 1,193 purchases (86.14 per cent of the
auctions)20. These findings are consistent with historical studies by Alarco´n
(1973), Dı´az (1977) and Meisel and Jaramillo (2007) who point out that the
process of disentailment was heterogeneous at the regional level and that the
departamentos that most contributed to disentailment were Cundinamarca,
Boyaca´ and Cauca (Narin˜o was part of the state of Cauca at that time)21.
Based on the data in Table 1, it is apparent that the departamentos (current)
that most contributed to disentailment, that is, where most purchases took
place (86.14 per cent), show concentration indexes closer to 1 (column 8):
Santander (0.93), Cundinamarca (0.8), Narin˜o (0.8) and Boyaca´ (0.75). The
same pattern of high inequality is also observed in some departamentos
(current) with fewer purchases: Norte de Santander (49 purchases, Gini of 0.88),
Huila (15 purchases, Gini of 0.83), Tolima (48 purchases, Gini of 0.72). In the
departamentos (current) with the smallest number of transactions (in today’s
Sucre, Casanare, Valle del Cauca), the Gini coefficient was relatively low
(approximately 0.5). For the country as a whole, the Gini index was 0.89, con-
firming the popular belief that disentailed land became concentrated in the
hands of very few individuals instead of promoting a more equal distribution of
20 The information was treated in the following way: the municipal data were taken and then
the municipality within the current departamento to which it belonged was located and the calcu-
lations were carried out in each case. In other words, the current political division of the country
consisting of 32 departamentos with Bogota as the capital district was used.
21 Historical studies show that Antioquia was one of the states in which disentailment was most
difficult due to clerical opposition (see Dı´az 1977; Oficina De Investigaciones Socioecono´micas y
Legales, Ofisel 1975).
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF DISENTAILED LAND BY DEPARTAMENTO (STATE)
km2
Percentage
of km2
Valued Price
(thousands of
pesos)
Paid price
(thousands of
pesos)
Number of
purchases Gini
1 2 3 4 5 6
Cundinamarca 298.49 17.34 843.26 3002.74 501 0.80
Santander 361.08 20.98 146.43 537.97 310 0.93
Boyaca´ 249.21 14.48 305.07 1295.73 193 0.75
Narin˜o 81.05 4.71 188.90 815.88 189 0.80
Norte de Santander 166.41 9.67 32.10 73.19 49 0.88
Tolima 218.27 12.68 51.88 119.60 48 0.72
Cauca 9.10 0.53 29.04 99.89 45 0.63
Antioquia 1.02 0.06 35.51 80.47 16 0.72
Huila 25.73 1.50 8.50 41.98 15 0.83
Bolı´var 7.29 0.42 4.16 8.82 8 0.65
Sucre 301.83 17.54 2.90 7.41 5 0.54
Casanare 1.29 0.08 3.60 10.70 3 0.46
Valle del Cauca 0.16 0.01 1.51 4.15 3 0.64
Total 1720.95 100.00 1652.86 6098.52 1385 0.89
Source: AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollo 1 a 30), Diario Oficial (1864-1884), Villegas (1977), Courvel (1940) and authors’
calculations. The calculations were made using the current political division of Colombian departamentos.
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property. Although it is difficult to determine how disentailed land purchases
affected the land distribution before the disentailment process, existing evi-
dence from notary archives compiled by Sa´nchez et al. (2007) shows that the
Gini of land lot prices traded in 1857 was around 0.79. Similar figures are
obtained for other years. The 1857 price Gini, although high, is lower than the
figure of 0.89 obtained for the disentailed land Gini22. The Lorenz curve for both
size of disentailed lots and prices of traded lots is depicted in Figure 2. In
addition, land price Ginis are in general higher than land size Ginis as large
states are less rough (rustic?) and have better soil and irrigation and hence
higher prices per unit of land.
Since article 6 of the 1861 decree emphasized that large tracts of church
lands had to be divided into small lots in order to increase the number
of individuals with access to disentailed land, scholars such as Meisel and
Jaramillo (2007) have argued that the disentailment of mortmain land
FIGURE 2
LORENZ CURVES FOR PRICES OF TRADED LOTS IN 1857 AND DISENTAILED
LAND LOT SIZES
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Source: AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollo 1 a 30), Diario Oficial
(1864-1884) and AGN Fondo Notarias, Notaria 1 de Bogota, an˜o de 1857, Volumen 348-350, Tomos 1-3.
22 Williamson (2009) concluded recently that around 1790 the Gini coefficient of income for
Latin America reached 57.6, up from 36.2 in 1491. Although income and land Ginis are not com-
parable, Williamson’s figure suggests that the distribution of wealth in Latin America during the
19th century was flatter than the one obtained from the data on disentailed purchases.
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succeeded in prompting a more egalitarian access to land. However, as we
have seen, land ended up in the hands of few individuals and one of the
principal goals of land reform failed. Villegas (1977), for instance, stressed
that small lots were not desirable to buyers, making it necessary to join them
in larger tracts in order to be offered for sale. Thus, Villegas writes:
«For example, in order to sell off common lots (ejidos) in Bogota´, it was
necessary to suspend the sale of smaller lots and regroup them into larger
lots because there were no buyers for the smaller lots» (Villegas 1977, p. 60).
In fact, the evidence shows that the allocation of small terrains among
different farmers did not happen and what actually occurred was a con-
solidation of large-scale properties (large estates). For example, in Pasto (in
today’s Narin˜o), the Sandona´ Hacienda was divided up into forty-eight lots,
thirty-nine of which were purchased by Manuel J. Valencia. The Negavita
property in Pamplona (in today’s Norte de Santander) was divided into five
lots, four of which were bought by Da´maso Zapata. The Hacienda Las
Monjas in Facatativa´ (Cundinamarca) was divided into thirty-four lots
bought by six people, confirming that the disentailment of mortmain land
actually reinforced large-scale holdings23.
The disentailment process as a whole encompassed 1,385 purchases with
334 buyers. The top ten buyers (3 per cent of the total) in Table 2 made up 440
purchases (31.77 per cent of the total), retaining almost 17 per cent of the total
area of land sold. These figures clearly confirm that large estates and land
concentration were strengthened as just a small number of individuals gained
control of a large amount of the expropriated land. In addition, some land
was concealed (unregistered mortmain land), mostly in regions like Cauca
and Antioquia in which the Catholic Church exercised a strong influence, as
pointed out by Meisel and Jaramillo (2007), confirming the difficult task of the
government in effectively implementing its legislation so as to successfully enact
land reform. In conclusion, land distribution policies implemented by the
central government were not very successful because: (i) they reproduced
land concentration by favouring a small group of individuals and thus did not
promote more equal distribution of land property, which was one of the chief
goals of the legislation; and to a lesser extent; and (ii) the opposition exercised
by the clergy through the concealment of mortmain land and the political power
it retained in certain departments, for example, in Antioquia.
It has been empirically shown that disentailed land remained con-
centrated and that the objectives of the legislation — de jure institutions —
were not achieved because landowners’ power and influence and, to a lesser
extent, the Church — de facto institutions — curbed the implementation of
23 AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollos 1-30), Diario Oficial
(1864-1884).
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land reforms. Thus, the case of disentailed land illustrates that where initial
inequalities existed, institutions evolved in a less democratic manner (per-
petuating inequality) benefiting a small elite. The consequences of such
concentrated benefits of land reforms would be low levels of investment in
public goods such as education. This will be developed in the next section.
4. ACCUMULATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND LAND
CONCENTRATION
Galor et al. (2004) emphasize that in societies in which land ownership is
concentrated, public spending on education is desirable for everyone except
the landowners, given that the benefits they receive from education are lower
than the money they pay in taxes24. The previous section described how
TABLE 2
TOP TEN BUYERS OF DISENTAILED LAND
Name of purchaser
Number of
purchases km2
Number of purchases
as percentage of total
km2 as
percentage
of total
Alejandro Cordova 44 134.87 3.18 7.8
Lucrecio Salcedo 71 46.60 5.13 2.7
Isaac Montejo 56 44.68 4.04 2.6
Lope Restrepo 42 42.26 3.03 2.5
Camilo A Garcı´a 27 6.89 1.95 0.4
Manuel J Valencia 39 4.78 2.82 0.3
Perea y Pa´ez 61 1.78 4.40 0.1
Trino Vargas 28 1.04 2.02 0.1
Timoteo Hurtado 44 0.98 3.18 0.1
Cruz Ballesteros 28 0.54 2.02 0.0
Total 440 284.42 31.77 16.53
Source: AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollo 1 a 30), Diario Oficial
(1864-1884), Courvel (1940) and authors’ calculations.
24 In more egalitarian societies (a more homogenous population), there are greater incentives
to invest in education and public goods. For example, Goldin and Katz (2003) argue that in the
19th century the United States was one of the most successful countries in terms of providing an
egalitarian system of education. This system of education was founded on a set of virtues based on
democratic principles: (i) public provision of services; (ii) decentralization of the educational system;
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disentailed land ended up in few hands and concluded that despite the fact
that legislation — the September 9, 1861 decree — sought to implement a
more equal distribution of land, this goal was not achieved due to the
influence that a small group of individuals had over the mechanisms of
disentailed land acquisition, which allowed them to appropriate most of it.
4.1. The early 20th century Colombian literacy rate in the Latin and
North American context
North America (United States and Canada) was characterized very early
on by high rates of literacy; in 1870, more than 80 per cent of the population
(10 years and older) could read25. In contrast, and according to Mariscal and
Sokoloff (2000), the Latin American case was not so positive: of the countries
with the highest rates of literacy, none were comparable to North America.
In 1900, Argentina and Uruguay reached literacy rates above 50 per cent,
followed by Chile and Cuba with 40 per cent and Costa Rica at 33 per cent
(see Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000)26. In the least successful cases, that is,
Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Honduras, it was not
until the 1920s that 30 per cent of the population was literate. Nevertheless,
as shown by Newland (1994), literacy rates did increase steadily throughout
the first half of the 20th century from 28 per cent in 1900 to 48 per cent in
1925, finally reaching 64 per cent in 1950. However, the rates were never
comparable to those of North America.
The relative prosperity of Argentina and Chile — in terms of literacy and
the number of children enrolled in school — in Latin America was due to the
influx of immigrants to urban centres (Newland, 1991, 1994)27. The success
(F’note continued)
(iii) public funding — through the sale of public land, parental contributions and taxes — assuring that
education be free; (iv) secular education; (v) gender neutrality; and (vi) a universal educational system
that provided access to all children.
25 In the United States in 1910, 92.3 per cent of the population was literate, three times the rate
of the most literate countries in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Cuba) and four
times more than in Brazil and Mexico (Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000).
26 In Latin America, the rate of literacy at the beginning of the 19th century was less than 10 per
cent. Within 50 years, that rate had increased 5 percentage points reaching 15 per cent, finally
reaching 27 per cent in 1900. The most prosperous countries in Latin America had the following
rates: (i) Argentina, 23.8 per cent in 1869 and 45.8 per cent in 1895; (ii) Chile, 23.3 per cent in 1864
and 30.3 per cent in 1885 (Newland 1991).
27 See Mariscal and Engerman (2000). These authors point out that in Argentina, despite the
fact that the literacy rate had risen to 22.1 per cent in 1869 and to 65 per cent in 1914, it was much
higher in urban areas. In 1895, the literacy rate in Buenos Aires was 71.8 per cent while in the rest of
the country it was only 42.8 per cent. This difference in literacy rates between foreigners and
nationals is corroborated by Newland (1991) who found that in 1895, 65 per cent of resident
foreigners in Argentina could read and write, a figure far above that of 47 per cent for those born in
Argentina. In Chile, 13.3 per cent of citizens could read and write compared to 46.3 per cent of
foreign residents.
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of Costa Rica was mainly thanks to the homogeneity of the population and
the egalitarian conditions that had existed since the colonial period, as it was
a society that lacked indigenous labour and precious metals. In conclusion,
the educational performance of countries in Latin America during the
19th century and early 20th century varies significantly as some countries
managed to reach higher levels of literacy and school enrolment than others28.
How did Colombia perform? Helg (1987) and Ramı´rez and Te´llez (2006)
argue that at the beginning of the 20th century, the percentage of adults in
Colombia who knew how to read was far below the Latin American average
as seen above. Based on the 1912 census, Helg (1987) found that the global
rate of literacy in people above the age of 7 years was 17 per cent. Although
this figure is clearly an overestimate, it shows that the country’s literacy rate
was quite low.
4.2. Accumulation of human capital and concentration
of disentailed land
According to the national census of 1912, the percentage of men who knew
how to read was 12.3 per cent29. Analysing the statistics found in the census
at the departmental level, and using current geographical boundaries as a
reference (see footnote 18), it is clear that in those departments in which a
higher percentage of men could read, there were no events of disentailed land
auctions. These departments were San Andre´s (26.12 per cent), Putumayo
(24.76 per cent), Caldas (17.06 per cent) and Quindı´o (17.02 per cent)30.
In the departments (current ones) in which the greatest number of pur-
chases took place and which had high rates of inequality of disentailed land
(Gini), the 1912 literacy levels were lower. Examples of this pattern include
Cundinamarca (including Bogota´) with a Gini of 0.8 and a literacy rate of
10.72 per cent, Boyaca´ with a Gini of 0.75 and a literacy rate of 8.07 per cent,
28 In Colombia, Ramı´rez and Salazar (2007) indicate that the poor educational performance of
Colombia — even in relation to other Latin American countries — was the result of the lack of
incentives to improve the system including: (i) an agrarian economic structure that did not depend
on skilled labour; (ii) a social structure in which only a small elite had access to education; (iii) low
and unstable wages for teachers; (iv) instability of the education budget due to civil wars;
(v) Church–State rivalry and governmental changes that impeded the organization of the system.
29 The 1912 census documents literacy exclusively among men. Not all of those who could read
could also write and censuses generally registered these two variables separately (Newland 1991,
1994 and the 1912 census). The proportion of men who could write in Colombia in 1912 was 10.72
per cent. According to Newland (1991, 1994), it was to be expected that this percentage would be
lower than the percentage of men who could read (12.33 per cent) as people were usually taught
how to read and then how to write. Enrolled male children as a percentage of the population were
2.75 per cent.
30 This same result is obtained in the case of men who could write: San Andre´s (25.6 per cent),
Putumayo (21.9 per cent), Caldas (17.1 per cent) and Quindı´o (17 per cent). For enrolled male
children, the results are almost identical. The three departments with the highest enrollment rates
were Putumayo (14.07 per cent), San Andre´s (8.21 per cent) and Caldas (3.8 per cent).
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and Santander with a Gini closer to 1 and a rate of literacy just above the
national average31. Figure 3 presents the correlation between the logarithm
of disentailed land and the indicators of 1912 human capital, which confirms
the negative relationship between land concentration and the 1912 literacy
rates and the 1912 percentage of children enrolled in school (as a proportion
of the population).
Both the high concentration of disentailed land — a Gini coefficient of 0.89
at the national level — and the low percentage of men who could read, write
and attended school at the national level (12.33, 10.72 and 2.75 per cent,
respectively) should be highlighted. To discover the effects that disentailed
land had on the provision of education empirically is the main purpose of the
paper. It should be pointed out that despite the fact that some of the Church’s
possessions were expropriated to be redistributed, ownership of the former
church lands was concentrated in the hands of a small group of landowners
who used their de facto political and economic power for that purpose. It is
then to be expected that as land ownership became more concentrated, the
provision of education, ceteris paribus, would have diminished in those places
FIGURE 3
CORRELATION BETWEEN HECTARES OF DISENTAILED LAND AND HUMAN
CAPITAL INDICATORS
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Source: AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollo 1-30), Diario Oficial
(1864-1884), Courvel (1940), Censo de 1912 and authors’ calculations.
31 In the case of men who knew how to write in 1912, the same pattern is found. For instance,
Cundinamarca (9.9 per cent) and Boyaca´ (7.3 per cent) were both below the national average. The
same result is found for the percentage of enrolled children in 1912: Cundinamarca (2.31 per cent,
which is 0.43 percentage points below the national average) and Boyaca´ (1.60 per cent or 1.14
percentage points below the national average).
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that experienced disentailed land purchases. As landowners became more
powerful, their ability to lower their tax burden may have been strengthened,
which would have negatively affected the provision of education.
In this regard, Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000) stated that initial inequalities
limited investment in public education. Thus, in Latin American societies char-
acterized by high levels of inequality, the provision of public education was scarce
and the provision of human capital was very limited. In section 5, this negative
relationship between land concentration originating in the disentailment process
and the accumulation of human capital will be examined empirically.
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
5.1. Empirical model
The empirical model attempts to show the negative relationship between
the concentration of land — in this case disentailed land — and human
capital measured as the proportion of literate males to total population in
1912. The econometric model to be estimated is the following:
A1912
i
¼ b0 þ b1 Disentailed Hectaresi þ b2 Geographyi
þ b3 Population 1870i þ i ½1
in which A1912
i
represents the percentage of males in each municipality i who
could read in 1912, or the proportion of males enrolled at school to the total
population in 1912. Disentailed Hectares refers to the total number of dis-
entailed hectares purchased in municipality i during the period 1864-1884.
Geography variables collected by Sa´nchez and Nu´n˜ez (2000) include land
erosion, precipitation and altitude, which may have affected access to
schools. For instance, in places of higher altitude or moderate rain pre-
cipitation, the incidence of tropical diseases may have been lower and hence
children’s health better, which may have influenced school attendance
positively. By the same token, terrains with relatively high levels of erosion
would have had low levels of agricultural output, which may have reduced
schooling rates and forced children to work. Geography also contains the
distance to Bogota´ — the country’s capital and to the Pacific and the
Caribbean Seaports. It is expected that the further a municipality was located
from those places, the more difficult the provision of education would have
been. Finally, as it is anticipated that in more urban and highly populated
municipalities the provision of and access to education would have been
higher, Population 1870 is used as the control.
It has been shown that disentailed land remained concentrated in the
hands of a small group of individuals, so that the hectares variable — that is,
the quantity of disentailed hectares — may be a good indicator to determine
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land concentration. Figure 4 supports this idea since the correlation between
the logarithm of disentailed land at the municipal level and the Gini coefficient
is positive, which may confirm that the greater the amount of disentailed
hectares, the higher the index of disentailed land inequality.
Nevertheless, allocation of disentailed land may be endogenous to human
capital despite the fact that this variable is observed years after disentailment
occurred. The reason is that 19th century human capital may have deter-
mined both the amount and concentration of disentailed land and the level of
20th century human capital. In other words, low levels of human capital in
the past may be linked to higher purchases of disentailed land and current
(1912) low levels of human capital. In addition, there could have been an
unobserved variable that influenced both disentailed land purchases in the
1870s and human capital indicators in 1912.
In order to solve the possible source of this omitted variable or endogeneity
biases, the variable year of the municipality foundation was used as an instru-
ment for hectares of disentailed land. It is expected that — after controlling
for population and geography variables — there would be larger amounts of
disentailed land in those municipalities founded during earlier periods and
smaller amounts in those municipalities founded more recently. In other words,
the older the municipality, the longer the Church may have been favoured by
mortmain land and the larger the quantity of such land in the hands of the
FIGURE 4
CORRELATION BETWEEN HECTARES PURCHASED AND GINI OF DISENTAILED
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Source: AGN, Seccio´n Repu´blica, Fondo de Bienes Desamortizados (Rollo 1 a 30), Diario Oficial (1864-
1884), Courvel (1940) and authors’ calculations.
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Church. In this way, year of the municipality foundation (founding year) is
correlated only with the independent variable (hectares) but uncorrelated with
the dependent variables (literacy and school enrolment in 1912).
Thus, the first stage equation will be as follows:
Disentailed Hectaresi ¼ a0 þ a1 Geographyi þ a2 Population 1870i
þ a3 founding yeari þ ni ½2
Consequently, a negative relationship between those municipalities with a more
recent year of foundation and the quantity of disentailed hectares is expected.
5.2. Econometric results32
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and the first and second stages of Instrumental Variables (IV) estimations for
the 1912 human capital measures — males who could read and were enrolled
in school in 1912 as a percentage of the population. The OLS results in
columns 3 and 6 show that, after controlling for geography and population,
the effect of disentailed land purchases on both measures of 1912 human
capital is negative, but non-significant in the case of percentage of enrolled
children. Given the likely bias of the OLS coefficients, an IV approach is
undertaken. The first stage results are presented in column 4 and, as
expected, the instrumental variable founding_year is negatively and sig-
nificantly correlated (at 99 per cent) with disentailed land purchases in the
period 1864-1884. Thus, the later the foundation of a particular municipality,
the lower the amount of land kept by the Catholic Church would have been.
The strength of the instrument is shown by the Stock–Yogo test for the
Cragg–Donald F-statistic, which rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments
at the 10 per cent level if one is willing to accept a maximum weak instru-
ment bias of 20 per cent. The endogeneity test indicates that the null
hypothesis of non-endogeneity is rejected, pointing out that the OLS coeffi-
cient for disentailed hectares is indeed biased.
Other covariates in the first stage also have the expected signs and are
highly significant. Thus, in municipalities with larger populations and closer
to Bogota, the Church accumulated more land. Columns 5 and 7 contain the
second-stage IV results indicating that disentailed land purchases in a
municipality were negatively correlated to literacy rates and school enrolment.
Thus, the relationship is negative and significant at 95 and 90 per cent, respec-
tively. For instance, if the amount of land disentailed increased 1 per cent, the
32 As previously mentioned, not every man who could read could also write, so that the same
econometric exercise was performed taking the percentage of men who could write in 1912 as a
dependent variable. Similar results (not reported) were found in the case of the population that
could read.
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TABLE 3
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES (1912)
Descriptive
statistics
Percentage of males who
could read in 1912
Percentage of males enrolled in
school in 1912
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variables
Mean and
SD OLS First stage
Second
stage TSLS OLS First stage
Second
stage TSLS
Percentage of males who 0.123
could read in 1912 0.057
Percentage of males 0.026
enrolled in school in 1912 0.019
Purchases of disentailed 1.052 20.0023** 20.0351** 20.0002 20.0064*
hectares 2.261 (0.0009) (0.0154) (0.0003) (0.0036)
Erosion index 3.840 20.001 0.1375** 0.0035 20.0010* 0.1329** 20.0001
1.238 (0.0018) (0.0701) (0.0036) (0.0005) (0.0649) (0.0008)
Precipitation 1.702 0.0012 20.2518** 20.0089 0.0014** 20.2441*** 20.0004
0.986 (0.0022) (0.0905) (0.0060) (0.0007) (0.0864) (0.0014)
Altitude above sea level 1.339 0.0175*** 20.1348 0.0130** 0.0075*** 20.1277 0.0067***
(thousands, metres) 0.912 (0.0030) (0.1180) (0.0053) (0.0009) (0.1127) (0.0012)
Distance to Bogota´ 2.501 0.0122*** 20.4339*** 20.0024 0.0037*** 20.4428*** 0.0008
1.657 (0.0018) (0.0682) (0.0074) (0.0005) (0.0647) (0.0018)
Distance to the main 3.527 20.0062*** 0.2923*** 0.0031 20.0044*** 0.2940*** 20.0026**
Pacific sea port 1.843 (0.0020) (0.0797) (0.0055) (0.0006) (0.0758) (0.0013)
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TABLE 3 (Cont.)
Distance to the main 5.373 20.0050*** 0.1872*** 0.0008 20.0032*** 0.1849*** 20.0021**
Caribbean sea port 2.400 (0.0015) (0.0585) (0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0555) (0.0008)
Total population in 1870 3.617 0.0018*** 0.1523*** 0.0071*** 0.0010*** 0.1507*** 0.0020***
(thousands) 3.402 (0.0006) (0.0239) (0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0232) (0.0006)
Founding year 1685 20.0013*** 20.0014***
168 (0.0005) (0.0004)
Number of observations 676 676 676 724 724 724
Endogeneity test 11.944 4.464
(P-value) 0.0005 0.0346
Stock and Yago test 7.190** 8.335**
Notes: Standard errors for the coefficients are in brackets below the coefficients. The table reports OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) and the first and second
stage of the TSLS (Two-Stage Least Squares).
Critical values for the Stock and Yogo weak instrument test (5% significance) based on TSLS size with exact identification are 16.38, 8.96, 6.66 and 5.53,
for the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% sizes, respectively.
*, **, ***: 90%, 95% and 99% significance respectively.
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proportion of literate males would be 0.035 lower. This same relationship is
confirmed when using the case of male children who attended school,
showing a 1 per cent increase in the quantity of disentailed land, where the
rate of enrolment would be 0.006 lower. The relative impact of disentailed
land purchases is considerable. For instance, a change in one standard
deviation of the latter variable would have reduced in 1.3 standard deviations
of the 1912 percentage of literate males and in 0.79 standard deviations
of the 1912 percentage of males enrolled at school. This means that the
concentration of disentailed land had important negative effects on the
accumulation of human capital.
Thus, the results validate the hypothesis that the greater the concentra-
tion of economic power measured through size of landholdings, the lower
the investment in public goods such as education. Although the expropria-
tion of Catholic Church assets was aimed at making the distribution of land
property more egalitarian, the de facto institutions (the political and eco-
nomic power of the elite) made this goal impossible to achieve and, on the
contrary, simply reproduced and even worsened the existing inequality.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, two major conclusions were reached. First, it was quantita-
tively verified that the Liberal administrations’ attempt to achieve better land
distribution through disentailment failed due to the strong influence that a
small group of individuals had on the institutions in charge of handling the
disentailment process. The final result was that, despite the legislation, the
expropriated church land ended up in few hands. Second, a negative rela-
tionship between land concentration and the accumulation of human capital
was confirmed. In fact, it was found that the greater the amount of disentailed
land purchases in a particular municipality, the lower was its future rates of
literacy and school enrolment. Despite the fact that during the second half of
the 19th century the Liberal administrations divested the Church of its land,
precisely to attain a more equal distribution of land, the final upshot was that
the allocation of disentailed land exhibited even higher levels of concentration.
For instance, the Gini coefficient of disentailed land purchases was 0.89 while
the figure prior to the disentailment process was in fact lower. This negative
outcome evidenced the political manipulation of the disentailment laws for
the benefit of landowners. Thus, excluding property rights institutions inher-
ited from the colonial period impeded the redistribution of land ownership
during the post-independence reducing the incentives for the provision of
growth-enhancing public goods (Coatsworth 2008). In consequence, the
concentration of disentailed land reproduced and even enhanced both the
economic and political power of landowners and curbed investment in
human capital and hence long-run economic development.
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Thus, the political power retained by this group of individuals — large
landowners –– led to lower levels of accumulation of human capital. This
group could have used its political influence to avoid contributing to the
investment in public goods, for example, through a refusal to pay direct taxes
on their wealth and properties in line with the reasoning of Sokoloff and
Zolt (2007). The negative relationship between land concentration and social
indicators is corroborated through an econometric model that verified the
negative and significant relationship between disentailed hectares in the
1870s — and thus concentration of land — and the rates of literacy and
school enrolment in 1912.
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